Representative publications:

"Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments" Intuitions Booth and Rowbottom (eds.) (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2013). 

"Scanlon’s Promising Proposal and the Right Kind of Reasons to Believe," in Timmons, ed. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 3 (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2013), 59-78.
ralism" Ethics,120 (April 2010) pp. 495-525.

“A Fork in the Road for Expressivism,” review essay on Mark Schroeder’s Being For; Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism, in Ethics 120 (Jan. 2010) 357-381.

"Some Advantages of One Form of Argument for the Maximin Principle," Acta Analytica, Volume 23, No. 4 (2008) 

"Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument," Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume I ed. by Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2006).

"Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic," Ratio (2005) 190-205.

"The Plausibility of Satisficing and the Role of the Good in Ordinary Thought," in Satisficing and Maximizing; Moral Theorists on Practical Reason ed. by Michael Byron(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

"Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism about Moral Judgements," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV, No. 1 (July 2002).

"Should Motivational Humeans be Humeans About Rationality?," Topoi (2002).

"Motivational Internalism; A Somewhat Less Idealized Version," Philosophical Quarterly (April 2000).

"Affirmative Action, Non-consequentialism and Responsibility for the Effects of Past Discrimination," Public Affairs Quarterly (July 1997), pp. 281-301.

"Expressivism and Irrationality," The Philosophical Review (July 1996), pp. 322-335.

"Moral Functionalism and Moral Reductionism," The Philosophical Quarterly (January 1996), pp. 77-81.

"Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality," Philosophical Studies 79 (1995), pp. 37-57.