Graduate Student Colloquia

Presenter: Jabran Amanat-Lee

Title: Motivating a Non-Factualist Account for Nothing

Presentation

Abstract: Generally, we draw distinctions between objects. My dog sitting on the couch is an object, and the computer I am using is another. These we generally take to exist. We also have a concept of non-existence. We generally take that certain things do not exist, and we often say that they are nothing, that certain objects go out of existence and become nothing. This paper investigates the question of nothing. That is, we casually utter sentences like (n): x is nothing. In (n), we have the term nothing. In uttering (n), we refer to nothing. But what is that - what is nothing? I motivate a non-factualist account of nothing, which, crudely, is the view that Parmenideanism and anti-Parmendianism are not cogent; there is no fact of the matter pertaining to nothing. To substantiate the thesis, I first discuss Parmenideanism and Anti-Parmenideanism and argue that commitment to either of these gives rise to the problem of nothing and further related issues. Then, I discuss some accounts already on the market to answer the problem of nothing. I explore Quine, Russell, Meinong, Azzouni, Priest, and Mumford's attempts and argue that these attempts fail. Afterward, I explore what strategy one should adopt in developing a non-factualist account of nothing. i argue that strategies such as the elimination strategy and conceptual analysis are unhelpful for this endeavor and propose adopting the stipulation strategy. In developing the non-factualist account of nothing, I discuss that one could attempt to develop Yablo-style and Balaguer-style arguments to argue for non-factualism for nothing; however, I argue that these programs, although powerful, remain wanting when it comes to nothing. So, I propose and develop a new argument to motivate a non-factualist account of nothing.

Presenter: Adara Vinal

Title: TBD

Presentation

Abstract:

Presenter: Janelle Gormley - Grad/Faculty Colloquium

Title: TBD

Presentation

Abstract:

Presenter: Drew Gallagher

Title: Moral Confusion Comes from Ourselves: Moral Clarity Comes from the Sittlichkeit

Presentation

Abstract: Do I decide what my responsibilities are, or do others decide that for me? Many philosophers have understood the crowning achievement of modernity to largely consist in modern man's assertion of his individual autonomy and his liberation from every form of authority that does not begin with the individual. Governments must be based on the protection of individual rights. Religion must be freely consented to by the individual believer. Even family itself has largely become a matter of individual preference. It was not always this way. As romantic critics of the Enlightenment, Hegelians have argued that the transition from the medieval to modern world is one step forward but one step backwards. In exchange for granting greater recognition to the subjective spirit, modernity has sacrificed its recognition to the subjective spirit, modernity has sacrificed its recognition of our sittlichkeit (ethical-order) which exists objectively as the collection of duties and responsibilities that really are owed to others and to ourselves. Without an objective moral community life, the step into the modern world is a step out of meaning into alienation. Neo-Hegelians like Robert Brandom have suggested that we must seek to overcome this subjective alienation from the world by recreating our sittlichkeit in order to give us objective meaning without sacrificing modernity's recognition of the importance of the free subject. Eric Wiland has suggested that by recognizing the authority of others' moral claims, the individual can be pulled out of his isolation and the group can be transformed into a collective we. Building off Hegel, Brandom, and Wiland, I want to explore the notion that our lives are richer and more righteous when we let our lives and our conscience be steered from outside voices in addition to our own internal conscience.

Presenter: Youmin Kim

Title: Rationality, With or Without Deliberation

Presentation

Abstract: The purpose of this presentation is to see whether deliberation is necessary to account for rationality. My tentative conclusion suggests that deliberation is necessary in accounting for rationality. I primarily focus my analysis on Arpaly's argument concerning rationality, using it as a foundation to highlight the necessity of deliberation. Arpaly contends that deliberation is not necessary to explain rationality, considering the case of dawning that an agent can rationally change their mind with gradual and steady encounters with new evidence. However, I claim that her reasoning is incomplete because dawning is structurally impossible to explain belief changes in the opposite direction, such as changing from believing in P to disbelieving in P. This limitation arises from the dawning's incapacity to pinpoint the exact moment when an agent flips her belief. By focusing on an analysis of this flipping moment, I conclude that deliberation is necessary to explain rationality, as the belief changes in the opposite direction necessarily requires the deliberative process.

Presenter: Henrique Cassol Leal

Title: TBD

Presentation

Abstract:

Presenter: Eunhong Lee

Title: TBD

Presentation

Abstract:

Presenter: Speaker Series:
October 20th: Seana Schiffrin;
October 27th, Renee Jorgensen;
LPH 124, 3:30 to 5:30pm

Presenter: Hans Zhao

Title: TBD

Presentation

Abstract:

Presenter: Seungchul Yang

Title: TBD

Presentation

Abstract:

Presenter: Chen Xia

Title: TBD

Presentation

Abstract:

Thanksgiving Holiday

Presenter: Xuan Yang

Title: TBD

Presentation

Abstract:

Presenter: Swarnima Kain

Title: TBD

Presentation